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The following article argues that fictional texts can be distinguished from non-fictional texts in 
a prototypical way, even if the concept of the fictional cannot be defined in classical terms. In 
order to be able to characterize fictional texts, semantic, pragmatic, and reader-conditioned 
factors have to be taken into account. With reference to Frege, Searle, and Gabriel, the article 
recalls some proposals for how we might define fictional speech. Underscored in particular is 
the role of reception for the classification of a text as fictional. I make the case, from a 
philosophical perspective, for the view that fictional texts represent worlds that do not exist 
even though these worlds obviously can, and de facto do, contain many elements that are 
familiar to us from our world. I call these worlds reading worlds and explain the relationship 
between reading worlds and the life world of readers. This will help support the argument that 
the encounter with fictional literature can invoke real feelings and that such feelings are by no 
means irrational, as some defenders of the paradox of fiction would like us to believe. It is the 
exemplary character of fictional texts that enables us to make connections between the reading 
worlds and the life world. 
First and foremost, the article discusses the question of what it is that readers’ feelings are in 
fact related to. The widespread view that these feelings are primarily related to the characters 
or events represented in a text proves too simple and needs to be amended. Whoever is sad 
because of the fate of a fictive character imagines how he or she would fare if in a similar 
situation. He or she would feel sad as it relates to his or her own situation. And it is this feeling 
on behalf of one’s self that is the presupposition of sympathy for a fictive character. While 
reading, the feelings related to fictive characters and content are intertwined with the feelings 
related to one’s own personal concerns. The feelings one has on his or her own behalf belong 
to the feelings related to fictive characters; the former are the presupposition of the latter. If we 
look at the matter in this way, a new perspective opens up on the paradox of fiction. Generally 
speaking, the discussion surrounding the paradox of fiction is really about readers’ feelings as 
they relate to fictive persons or content. The question is then how it is possible to have them, 
since fictive persons and situations do not exist. If, however, the emotional relation to fictive 
characters and situations is conceived of as mediated by the feelings one has on one’s own 
behalf, the paradox loses its confusing effect since the imputation of existence no longer plays 
a central role. Instead, the conjecture that the events in a fictional story could have happened in 
one’s own life is important. The reader imagines that a story had or could have happened to 
him or herself. Readers are therefore often moved by a fictive event because they relate what 
happened in a story to themselves. They have understood the literary event as something that is 
humanly relevant in a general sense, and they see it as exemplary for human life as such. This 
is the decisive factor which gives rise to a connection between fiction and reality. The emotional 
relation to fictive characters happens on the basis of emotions that we would have for our own 
sake were we confronted with an occurrence like the one being narrated. What happens to the 
characters in a fictional text could also happen to readers. This is enough to stimulate 
corresponding feelings. We neither have to assume the existence of fictive characters nor do we 
have to suspend our knowledge about the fictive character of events or take part in a game of 
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make-believe. But we do have to be able to regard the events in a fictional text as exemplary 
for human life. 
The representation of an occurrence in a novel exhibits a number of commonalities with the 
representation of something that could happen in the future. Consciousness of the future would 
seem to be a presupposition for developing feelings for something that is only represented. This 
requires the power of imagination. One has to be able to imagine what is happening to the 
characters involved in the occurrence being narrated in a fictional text, ›empathize‹ with them, 
and ultimately one has to be able to imagine that he or she could also be entangled in the same 
event and what it would be like. Without the use of these skills, it would remain a mystery how 
reading a fictional text can lead to feelings and how fictive occurrences can be related to reality. 
The fate of Anna Karenina can move us, we can sympathize with her, because reading the novel 
confronts us with possibilities that could affect our own lives. The imagination of such 
possibilities stimulates feelings that are related to us and to our lives. On that basis, we can 
participate in the fate of fictive characters without having to imagine that they really exist. 
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